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PUBLIC LAW
RESEARCH INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW WORKING
PAPER SERIES, SPRING 1998 Civil Liability for Suicide Barriers Mary B. Reiten and David J. Jung Papers
in the PLRI Working Papers Series are produced by students at Hastings College
of the Law. The views expressed do not represent the views or policies of
Hastings College of the Law, its Board of Directors or its faculty. PLRI
Working Papers are not a substitute for legal advice, and persons seeking
legal advice should consult a lawyer. Public Law Research
Institute (415) 565-4671 Civil
Liability for Suicide Barriers by Mary Reiten and David J. Jung *Mary Reiten is a member of the Hastings
Class of 1998. David J. Jung is Professor of Law and Director, Public Law
Research Institute.
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I. Introduction The working paper approaches the
question in two steps. First, it examines whether, under California law, a
public entity is civilly liable if an individual uses property the entity
administers to commit suicide. Then, it examines whether building a suicide
barrier would increase the possibility of the public entity being held liable
for damages. UC Hastings College of the Law Page 1 |
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In California, a public entity can be held liable for
personal injuries only if a statute specifically provides for liability.2
According to § 815.2 (a) of the California Government Code, a public
entity can be liable for injuries caused by its employees’ acts or omissions
if the employees themselves would be liable. Under California common law,
however, only a person who is in a “special relationship” with someone who
commits suicide can be held legally responsible for failing to prevent the
suicide. Because there is no “special relationship” between the employees
of a public entity administering a bridge and those who might use the bridge
to commit suicide, neither a bridge district nor its employees would be liable
for an act or omission that resulted in a suicide. 2Cal. Gov’t. Code § 815 (a). 3Ca1. Gov’t. Code § 835. 4CaI. Gov’t. Code § 830 (a) (emphasis added).
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Neither of these conclusions would
change if the design of the bridge were altered by placing a suicide barrier
on it. Further, even if there were a legal basis for imposing liability for a
suicide, decisions like the decision to build a barrier are afforded special
protection under the Government Code. When a public entity exercises its
discretion to approve a design, it cannot be held liable so long as
substantial evidence supports its decision that the design is a reasonable
one.5 |
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action against that
employee..” The question then
becomes, when would a cause of action arise against a public employee whose
acts or omissions led to a suicide? Civil liability for failure
to prevent a suicide is extremely limited. Ordinarily, suicide is considered
an independent intervening cause that negates liability of persons who might
otherwise be held responsible for a person’s welfare. The independent
intervening act of suicide breaks the chain of causation.6 A duty to prevent a suicide
can arise, however, under limited circumstances. Two elements need to exist
before a duty to prevent suicide is created.7 First, a special relationship
must exist between the potential suicide and the person who might have
prevented the suicide. Second, the person who might have prevented the suicide
must have had notice of the potential suicide’s suicidal tendencies. Courts have found “special relationships” to
exist with regard to the risk of suicide largely in professional
relationships, such as the psychiatrist-patient, hospital-patient, or
doctor-patient relationship.8 A special relationship may also exist
between a school official or teacher and a student,9 or a jailer or
prison official and his or her prisoner.10 What sets these
relationships apart is typically either custody of or control over the person
who is likely to commit suicide, or some legal, contractual, or professional
obligation to care for that person. UC
Hastings College of the Law
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| There are no reported cases in California or elsewhere in which a court has found a special relationship” and a duty to act to prevent a suicide based upon the simple fact that an entity owns or controls the property on which the suicide took place, even if the property has been the site of prior suicides or suicide attempts. The only reported court decision that has come close to such a position is Sneider v. Hyatt Corporation11, a federal district court opinion applying Georgia law. In Sneider, the court suggested that a hotel might have had a duty to a guest who committed suicide, and commented that the “defendant was on notice that the upper floors of its hotel have become an attractive location for suicides.” The court’s suggestion that a duty might exist, however, was based on the relationship between a hotel and its guest, and not simply on the ownership of the place where the suicide occurred. The thrust of court’s remark concerning past suicides was to the effect that if a special relationship existed, past events should have put the hotel on notice that another suicide was possible. |
B. Dangerous
Condition of Public Property Except as provided by
statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition
of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a
dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately
caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a
reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that
either: 11390 F. Supp. 976 (N.D.Ga. 1975). UC Hastings College of the Law
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(b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under § 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition. A dangerous condition is defined as: A condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.12 Unpublished opinion’4 by the California
Court of Appeals for the First Appellate District, the court relied on this
section to refuse to find the Golden Gate Bridge District liable for falling
to prevent a suicide. The court reasoned that “a person seeking
self-destruction is not acting with due care,” and that therefore the
definition of a dangerous condition in the statute did not include a condition
that created a risk of suicide. While the decision in Martinez cannot be cited
as precedent, it is consistent with other Court of Appeals decisions
interpreting the statute’s definition of a “dangerous condition.” In Fuller
v. State of California, for example, the court stated that although “it
is foreseeable that persons may use public property without due care, a public
entity is not liable for falling to take precautions to protect such
persons.”’5 Further, “[No] member of the public may ignore
the 12Cal. Gov’t Code § 835(a). 15 51 Cal.App.3d 926, 939, 125
Cal.Rptr. 586 (1975). |
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notice
which the condition itself provides.”16 The purpose of the statute imposing liability for
dangerous conditions on public property is to protect those who may not be
aware of the danger, and the danger of jumping off a bridge is obvious. So
long as the bridge is safe enough to allow persons acting with due care to
cross it safely, the bridge is not in a “dangerous condition” as defined
by the statute. Thus, under existing law, public authorities are not liable
for failing to prevent suicides from occurring on the bridges they administer. 1.
The Special Relationship There is no case law to support the idea that a
public entity that voluntarily builds a barrier to prevent suicides on
property it controls would, by that, create a special relationship between
itself and potential suicides.17 It is true that under some
circumstances, the law imposes |
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greater
duties on those who go to another’s aid than on those who merely stand by
and do not attempt to intervene. The Restatement (Second) of Torts has
summarized this principle as follows: (b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s
reliance upon the undertaking.18 Putting aside for a moment the limitations on
liability found in the Government Code, to impose liability for a suicide
based on this principle, the suicide’s estate would have to show that 1) the
barrier was negligently constructed; and either 2) the fact that it was
negligently constructed increased the risk of harm to the suicide; or 3) the
suicide relied on the barrier to prevent his or her death, and was injured
because of that reliance. The problem with this legal theory is that it relies
on an understanding of suicide that is very different from the understanding
that courts have traditionally adopted. Courts view an act of suicide as
intended to cause self-harm, and an argument that the suicide, paradoxically,
relied on the barrier and counted on it preventing his attempt, however
psychologically sophisticated, would not find legal support. Further, even if a court accepted this psychological
construct of suicide, the argument would turn on showing that the barrier was
negligently constructed, that is, that it was in a 18 Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 323. California courts have sometimes cited the section
approvingly, for example, in Coffee v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp. 8 Cal.3d 55,
105 Cal. Rptr. 358, 503 P.2d 1366 (1972). UC Hastings College of the Law
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dangerous condition, and the special protections in
the Government Code that apply to dangerous conditions of public property
would preclude liability.
Perhaps the closest case on point is Fredette v. City of Long
Beach.’9 In Fredette, the City of Long Beach was
undertaking to improve a pier at a lagoon. Throughout the construction
process, the lagoon remained accessible to the public. Lifeguards were
provided during limited hours, and the only signs warning of the dangerous
diving conditions were far from the water. The plaintiff in Fredette dove off the end of
the almost-completed pier and rendered himself a quadriplegic.20 The
court concluded that no dangerous condition existed because the lagoon’s
unsuitability for diving was obvious to anyone exercising due care. Lack of
signs or bafflers to prevent diving did not create a dangerous condition
because it would have been apparent to anyone using due care that diving off
the pier was dangerous. “When all the ________________________ 19187 Cal.App.3d 122, 231 Cal.Rptr. 598 (1986). 201d at 127-129. |
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circumstances are considered, the accident occurring here did not result from a ‘momentary miscalculation or lapse on the part of the human agent.”’2’ In the case of an obviously very high bridge,
building a baffler to prevent suicides would in no way contribute to the
danger that jumping off the bridge poses. The dangers inherent in jumping off
such bridges are obvious and cannot be ignored by any member of the public
using the bridge with due care. A suicide baffler on a bridge would not be a
dangerous condition even if it were possible to surmount it. UC
Hastings College of the Law
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again invoking § 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, that the public authority’s negligence had increased the risk of harm to the person it was intended to benefit. Neither a public entity nor a public
employee is liable under this chapter for an injury caused by the plan or
design of a construction of, or an improvement to, public property where such
plan or design has been approved in advance of the construction or improvement
by the legislative body of the public entity or by some other body or employee
exercising discretionary authority to give such approval or where such plan or
design is prepared in conformity with standards previously so approved, if the
trial or appellate court determines that there is any substantial evidence
upon the basis of which (a) a reasonable public employee could have adopted
the plan or design or the standards therefor or (b) a reasonable legislative
body or other body or employee could have approved the plan or design or the
standards therefor. Design immunity is a statutorily created affirmative
defense available to public entities when it is argued that the design of an
improvement is a “dangerous condition” that caused an injury? 22 It is “often raised on motion for
summary judgment or non-suit enabling the trial court to find the defense
established as a matter of law.”
23 If the public entity can show
that the UC
Hastings College of the Law
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allegedly “dangerous condition” was a part of the improvement’s design, that it had the discretion to approve the design, and that there was substantial evidence to support its conclusion that the design was reasonable, then the public entity is not liable for injuries the design may have caused.24 More concretely, so long as a suicide barrier’s construction conforms to its design, an argument that the design actually increased the risk of harm to someone attempting suicide would be unavailing, so long as the entity approving the design had some substantial evidence to support its conclusion that the design was reasonable. Even if the argument was that the barrier was negligently constructed -- that it did not in fact conform to its design --the public entity might still have a defense. Section 830.6 also provides: |
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shown that the rate of accident
occurrences is statistically significant 25 If there is a changed condition that
increases the risk of harm to someone who attempts to circumvent the barrier,
the entity administering the bridge would not be liable unless it had notice of
the condition and time to fix it. _________________________ UC Hastings College of the Law
Page 13 Public Law Research Institute May22, 1998 |
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to approve the design would be immunized so long as the entity had substantial
evidence to support its decision that the design was reasonable, and the entity
would be given a reasonable period of time to correct deficiencies in
construction that become known to it.
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Hastings College of the Law
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